Habermas’ Account of Solidarity for Europe: A Critical Reading
by Alessandro Volpe (San Raffaele University, Milan)
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the concept of solidarity in Habermas’ recent writings on the European Union’s crisis, meant as a key-factor in order to redeem Europe from its disintegration. The German philosopher no longer defines this notion as the 'reverse side' of justice, unlike the 80’s works (Habermas 1990); on the contrary, he attempts to conceive solidarity in its conceptual autonomy, by distinguishing it from other spheres of practical acts: justice, morality, charity and familial or clan aid. According to Habermas, the idea of political or civic solidarity may be useful in a transnational context such as Europe, because it concerns specifically stranger citizens in terms of morality and identity. The only bond that entails acts of solidarity between nations, groups and individuals is political cooperation. In his view, for example, it should be in the interest of Germany (and other creditor countries) to help debtor countries, in terms of objective political advantages and international reputation. The paper aims to demonstrate how this idea is complementary to Habermas’ theory of discursive democracy and the notion of “European Constitutional Patriotism”. Also, the paper shows how his recent attention on values such as solidarity and human dignity might be interpreted as a turning point from his formal proceduralism to other sources of normativity. In other words, the idealism of deliberative democracy seems to be replaced with a non-ideal theory of solidarity, even if it is only sketched. Indeed, the German philosopher’s stances after the European financial crisis focus more on systemic than “communicative” solutions, such us the proposal of establishing Eurobonds (Bofinger, Habermas, Nida-Rümelin, 2012) and the appeal for giving up on austerity’s measures against Greece (Habermas 2015). According to his theoretical and methodological premises, is solidarity a communicative or instrumental act? May it be conceived as a “third way” between these two kinds of action? By taking the European case, the concept of solidarity can fit into three different levels of cooperation based on shared action (Sangiovanni 2013; 2015), beyond Habermas’ strict dualism: European citizens’ relations, EU market and institutional sphere.
References:
Habermas, J. (1990). Justice and solidarity: On the discussion concerning Stage 6. In T. E. Wren (Ed.), Studies in contemporary German social thought.
Bofinger, P., Habermas, J., & Nida- Rümelin, J. (2012). The case for a change of course in European policy. Social Europe Journal.
Habermas, J. (2015). Merkel carried out 'an act of punishment' against Tsipras. The Guardian. Jul. 16.
Sangiovanni, A. (2013). Solidarity in the European Union. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1–29 Sangiovanni, A. (2015). Solidarity as Joint Action. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 32(4), pp. 340-359.
References:
Habermas, J. (1990). Justice and solidarity: On the discussion concerning Stage 6. In T. E. Wren (Ed.), Studies in contemporary German social thought.
Bofinger, P., Habermas, J., & Nida- Rümelin, J. (2012). The case for a change of course in European policy. Social Europe Journal.
Habermas, J. (2015). Merkel carried out 'an act of punishment' against Tsipras. The Guardian. Jul. 16.
Sangiovanni, A. (2013). Solidarity in the European Union. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1–29 Sangiovanni, A. (2015). Solidarity as Joint Action. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 32(4), pp. 340-359.
